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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-4076
___________
GREGORY CHAPMAN,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-15-cv-02350)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 5, 2017
Before: FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2017)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM
Gregory Chapman is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se. In December 2015,

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1

Chapman filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the District Court challenging
the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing and the Parole Board’s calculation of his
sentence.1 The District Court determined that Chapman’s claims were meritless and
denied the § 2241 petition by opinion and order entered July 13, 2016.
Approximately three months later, on October 18, 2016, Chapman sought leave to
file a belated motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must
be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.”). Chapman explained that
he had been in the course of moving from FCI Allenwood to FCI Fort Dix when the
District Court ruled on his petition in July 13, 2016, and did not receive a copy of the
decision until August 2016.
The District Court rejected Chapman’s untimely motion. The court noted that
even assuming that Chapman did not receive its decision until August 2016, he had not
explained his failure to move for reconsideration over the course of the subsequent three
months. Chapman now appeals from the District Court’s order.

28 U.S.C. § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner
who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence.” Coady v. Vaughn,
251 F.3d 480, 485-86 (3d Cir. 2001).
1
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 Because
Chapman’s motion for reconsideration was untimely under Rule 59(e), it did not toll the
running of the time to appeal from the District Court’s order denying the underlying
§ 2241 petition. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Therefore, this Court has
jurisdiction to review only the District Court’s order denying the untimely motion for
reconsideration. We review the District Court’s order denying Chapman’s motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. See Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc.
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).

We will summarily affirm the District Court’s order because this appeal
presents no substantial question. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The record
reflects that Chapman did not file his motion within the 28-day period provided by Rule
59(e). Therefore, the District Court acted within its discretion in denying Chapman’s
motion as time-barred under Rule 59(e). In fact, the District Court was not permitted to
consider this untimely motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).3 The motions for
appointment of counsel and bail are denied.

2

Chapman does not need a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal. See
United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), abrogated on
other grounds by Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012).
To the extent that the District Court could have construed Chapman’s motion as arising
under Rule 60(b) instead, we note that he did not allege any facts that would entitle him
to relief under any potentially applicable subsection of that Rule. See, e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect); 60(b)(2) (newly discovered
evidence); 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party);
60(b)(6) (extraordinary and special circumstances).
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